A mass stabbing attack on bystanders at a train station in China in March has again focused attention on the troubled Xinjiang province, writes MICHAEL CLARKE.
Dru C. Gladney argued over a decade ago that China faced the prospect of Xinjiang becoming its West Bank if it failed to address the problems stemming from its forceful attempts to integrate the region. In a neat summation of the problem, he argued that, 鈥榠f China does not explore other options besides repression, restriction and investment, millions of Uyghur Muslims might become disenfranchised, encouraging some to look to the intifada, the Taliban or al Qaeda for inspiration鈥�.1
The record of Chinese policy toward the Uyghur and Xinjiang in the intervening years suggests, sadly, that Gladney鈥檚 prediction may well prove to be correct due to the inability of Beijing to envisage that its own policies may play a role in alienating Uyghurs from the Chinese state.
Since the establishment of the People鈥檚 Republic of China in 1949, Beijing has been focused on achieving the territorial, political, economic and cultural integration of Xinjiang and its non-Han ethnic groups into the 鈥榰nitary and multi-ethnic鈥� Chinese state. Since the institution of 鈥榬eform and opening鈥� under Deng Xiaoping the core assumption of Chinese policy has been that the delivery of economic development and modernisation will ultimately buy the loyalty of such ethnic groups as the Uyghur.
This approach has been embodied since the early 1990s in state-led mega-projects such as massive oil and natural gas pipelines and infrastructure developments linking Xinjiang Central and South Asia. While bringing economic development, such projects have also (for example, the destruction of much of the old city of Kashgar through the $500 million Kashgar Dangerous House Reform program), displaced thousands, and brought an influx of Han migrants to the region. ultimately contribute to perceptions amongst Uyghurs of demographic dilution and economic disenfranchisement.
‘Strike hard’ campaigns
In parallel with this state-led modernisation strategy, the authorities have also implemented yearly 鈥榮trike hard鈥� campaigns against those that it defines as splittists and, since 9/11, terrorists and extremists. Prior to 9/11 these campaigns led to accelerated trials and sentencing of alleged 鈥榮plittists鈥�, while in the post-9/11 climate has seen an expansion in the actions that the state criminalises as terrorist with punitive measures increased.2 This approach continues with, Nur Berki, chairman of the Xinjiang regional government, for example, that the government would 鈥榗onstantly strike hard against violent terrorism, showing no mercy, in accordance with the law, and maintaining a high-handed posture鈥�.
The state鈥檚 continued desire to monitor and control elements of ethnic minority cultural and religious expression has also continued to contribute to Uyghur disaffection with Chinese rule. Since the 1990s the regional government with respect to 鈥榠llegal religious activities鈥欌�攊.e. all religious or cultural activities that take place outside of state-sanctioned parameters. Significantly, the government鈥檚 continued anti-religious campaigns played a role in stimulating some of the major episodes of unrest throughout the region in 2013, near Turpan on 26 June. Characteristic of the state鈥檚 heavy-handed approach has been the that is aimed at discouraging mostly Uyghur women from wearing traditional headscarves or veils.
On 1 March a group of eight masked assailants unleashed a mass stabbing attack on bystanders at Kunming train station leaving 29 people dead and over 140 injured. The Chinese government was quick to identify it as a terrorist attack by extremists from Xinjiang, with Foreign Ministry spokesman that 鈥榮ome Eastern Turkestan flags were found at the scene鈥�. Chinese authorities subsequently reported that four of the assailants (three men and one woman) had been shot dead and a second female attacker detained by police at the scene while the remaining three attackers (all male) were captured days after. Authorities also of the attack as Abdurehim Kurban, indicating the likely Uyghur ethnicity of the attackers.
Beijing鈥檚 response to what Chinese media has dubbed 鈥楥hina鈥檚 9/11鈥� has focused on three major fronts: strengthening of security and counter-terrorism preparedness; renewed exhortations regarding the importance of stability and ethnic unity; and a renewed effort to demonstrate the links between Uyghur terrorism and hostile external forces. With respect to the first issue, Beijing has rapidly increased Xinjiang鈥檚 internal security budget for 2014 to some $1 billion and President Xi Xinping now heads a specially formed committee on China鈥檚 new National Security Council to deal with security and counter-terror strategies in Xinjiang.
Ethnic unity myth
Meanwhile President Xi, in an effort to ensure his pet ideological project of the 鈥楥hina Dream鈥� would not be derailed by such an obvious baring of China鈥檚 ethnic problems, reminded Chinese citizens in the aftermath of the attack that, 鈥楿nity and stability are blessings, while secession and turmoil are disasters. People of all ethnic groups of the country should . However, as James Leibold has noted, the Kunming attack clearly reveals that the China Dream is not one shared by all of China鈥檚 ethnic groups and that .
Beijing鈥檚 current rhetoric is a continuation of a campaign launched after 9/11 to portray its struggle against Uyghur separatists as part of the US-led 鈥榃ar on Terror鈥�.
Finally, Beijing has made a concerted effort to draw links between the Kunming attack and radical Islamists beyond China鈥檚 borders in Central Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the wider Middle East. Chinese government spokesmen have linked the Kunming attackers to the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP), based in the tribal areas along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, which it claims is a successor organisation to the East Turkestan Islamic Party (ETIM), a group it has previously for various attacks in Xinjiang.
Despite the limited evidence available as to the effectiveness of groups such as the TIP, Beijing鈥檚 current rhetoric is a continuation of a campaign launched after 9/11 to portray its struggle against Uyghur separatists as part of the US-led 鈥榃ar on Terror鈥�. Although many have noted the diplomatic benefits that Beijing has achieved by aligning with the global anti-terrorist campaign, what has tended to pass unremarked upon is that China鈥檚 Uyghur terrorism narrative is arguably a reflection of Beijing鈥檚 inability to conceive that its policies in Xinjiang have played a role in generating violence and disaffection.3
Xinjiang Communist Party chief Zhang Chunxian revealed the continuation of this mindset when asked by reporters on 6 March about whether or not government policy had contributed to terrorism in Xinjiang. Zhang and answer arguing, 鈥榃ill it [terrorism] not take place if you don鈥檛 strike hard?鈥errorism is not something that happens because you fight it; it is a malignant tumour that is borne from society鈥�.
In an important respect Zhang is correct; terrorism in Xinjiang is indeed borne from society, but from an increasingly disenfranchised segment of Chinese society鈥攖he Uyghur. In light of the history of Chinese policy in Xinjiang and recent developments such as the Kunming attack it would seem that Beijing, in formulating a response to continued Uyghur opposition and violence, could do well to take heed of late Nelson Mandela鈥檚 reflection that, 鈥榠t is the oppressor who defines the nature of the struggle, and the oppressed is often left no recourse but to use methods that mirror those of the oppressor鈥�.4
References
- Dru C. Gladney, 鈥榅injiang: China鈥檚 future West Bank?鈥� Current History,(Sept. 2002), p. 267.
- For an examination of China鈥檚 anti-terror laws and their effect in Xinjiang see Michael Clarke, 鈥榃idening the net: China鈥檚 anti-terror laws and human rights in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region鈥�, International Journal of Human Rights, 14 (4), (2010), pp. 542鈥�558.
- For a critical examination of Chinese claims regarding Uyghur terrorism see Michael Clarke, 鈥楥hina鈥檚 鈥淲ar on Terror鈥� in Xinjiang: human security and the causes of violent Uighur separatism鈥�, Terrorism and Political Violence, 20 (2), (2008), pp. 271-301; and Sean Roberts, 鈥業maginary terrorism? The global war on terror and the narrative of the Uyghur terrorist threat鈥�, PONARS Eurasia Working Paper, (Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, March 2012).
- Nelson Mandela, Long walk tofreedom: Autobiography of Nelson Mandela, Little, Brown & Co. 1995.
Photo:
Uyghur man at Kashgar’s Sunday market ().